Under the Open Innovation paradigm, this paper analyzes emerging models of governance in platform-mediated networks subject to winner-takes-all competition regimes. Our research contends that modularity, an important attribute in technological systems, plays a relevant role in competition dynamics. The study is focused on the mobile networks industry, a highly dynamic and technology intensive sector, ideally suited to conduct research on competition under strong network effects. Based on a case study of an important firm in this sector, the paper finds that proprietary technological platforms require a large set of external contributors to ensure sustainable rates of development and innovation. Our results also suggest that, contrary to established theory, firms may opt for proprietary platforms rather than shared governance models and, nonetheless, they are able to successfully compete against the established ones.
Introduction
The economic globalization and the application of information and communication technologies offer firms the opportunity to develop new knowledge and increase the possibilities of accessing and spreading this knowledge through learning processes that generate new capabilities. This has generated a change in the economic paradigm that offers a new perspective of innovation [1] . In this sense, the concept of Open Innovation proposed initially by von Hippel and Henry Chesbrough refers to an emerging paradigm in which firms innovate relying on both internal and external firm resources [2] [3] [4] .
De Jong et. al. [5] define Open Innovation as the purposed usage of internal and external flows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation and expand markets for the external use of it. In this vein, the concept of Open Innovation departs from previous innovation modes in which oftentimes existing processes at the firm erect barriers to external knowledge thereby reducing absorptive capacity [6] .
In this context, relevant research into innovation by users [3] concludes that users have played a prominent role in product development, not only in traditional industries such as textile or chemistry, but more recently in software or semiconductor industry. Moreover, there exists empirical evidence of the relationship between user's involvement in product development and market's acceptance [7] . User's willing to take part into product improvements or the development of new concepts, have important characteristics as far as companies are concerned: They are currently experiencing needs which shall be later requested by regular consumers while, usually they are also capable of providing solutions to their own needs thereby conducting innovations by themselves.
There exists abundant literature documenting how companies have engaged with this kind of users, termed Lead Users [8] [9] [10] [11] . Prior researches have discussed the process of attracting, motivating and organizing users through communities that donate complementary goods and services [12] [13] [14] .
According to recent developments in strategic management, firms competing in sectors which are technology intensive and face strong network effects often compete based on a common framework of technical standards or interoperable technologies [15] . The objective of this paper is to analyze how firms competing in the mobile telecommunication industry are adopting new organizational arrangements in which external parties play a critical role as an important factor to compete in markets subject to technological uncertainty and winner-takes-all dynamics. For this purpose, platform-mediated networks serve as the theoretical framework upon which to understand competition dynamics and organizational structures [15] . This body of knowledge is adequate in contexts where strong network effects and systemic technologies are significant, as is the case of mobile telecommunication services.
Based on a real case, we study the way Ericsson is adapting its own internal structures and technology to compete in contexts of markets characterized by network effects, winner-takes-all syndrome and technological uncertainty. Following an Open Mode of innovation, the company involves external users in the early stages of innovation processes in order to explore new solutions better adapted to users' preferences and expectations. This new mode of collaborations posits some challenges either technical, organizational or knowledge-management related among others.
The research approach adopted in this paper is of qualitative nature due to several reasons. Firstly, focusing on a specific case study provides a richer context to understand how firms and internal business units react to external stimuli. Secondly, the research case method constitutes a good approximation to the phenomenon analyzed, especially in exploratory researches, as this one [16] , [17] , [18] . The qualitative case study presented in subsequent sections is triangulated with quantitative data from other firms [19] .
This paper contributes to the extant theory on platform-mediated networks considering additional factors that should be taken into account to establish stronger causal relationships between market dynamics and firms' organizational arrangements through a deep qualitative study of a firm in the mobile sector. More precisely we propose that the internal structure of the platform, in itself a technological system [20] , strongly influences the adopted model of governance by firms.
The paper is structured as follows. The section two presents platform-mediated networks, a relevant theory to understand competition dynamics in two-sided markets, and situates mobile ecosystems as instances of platform-mediated networks. Models of governance in platform-mediated networks are also discussed in this section and the influence of modularity, an intrinsic characteristic of technological systems, is presented as a paramount factor determining optimal models of governance in platform-mediated networks. Section three presents the case of a relevant player in the mobile industry in order to test the hypothesis formulated and provides insights on how large multinationals are adapting their business units and strategy to compete. Finally, section four summarizes the main conclusions, future lines for research and limitations of the paper.
Literature review

Platform-mediated Networks: elements and effects
Platform-mediated networks encompass users whose interactions are subject to network effects, along with intermediaries who provide a platform that facilitates user's interactions [21] . Many firms, not necessarily involved in the information and technology sector (IT), implement business models relying on platformmediated networks. This is the case with shopping malls, credit cards, web search, e-commerce, among others. With regards to IT, relevant companies such as Apple, Amazon, Google, Telefónica, Ericsson, Cisco, Nokia or Microsoft have developed their own platforms in order to engage with external stakeholders.
Platform-mediated networks are expected to provide some of the following services (1) connectivity, this is facilitating the transfer of goods or information, (2) variety, this is eliciting offers from supply-side users that vary along dimensions valued by demand-side users, (3) matching heterogeneous needs with suitable transaction partners and (4) price-setting services in which users disclose prices at which they are willing to exchange goods.
Network effects, which can be positive or negative, emerge if the value of the network perceived by a user depends on the number of interactions among the users of the network. Network effects may be same-sided, cross-sided or component-based [22] , [23] . Figure 1 represents these relationships along with the main elements intervening. Fig. 1 . The relationships in the elements. Source: adapted from [21] As depicted in the previous figure, platform mediated networks are consisted of distinct groups that can be aggregated according to: a) their preferences regarding the number of users of its same group (i.e. same-side network effects) and, b) their preferences with regards to users in other groups (i.e. cross-side network effects1). With this classification in mind, a conventional telephony network would be categorized as a onesided network as users will exhibit a positive preference for other similar users to participate in the network. As opposite, credit card services however demand at least two different groups of heterogeneous users: cardholders and merchants, and each of them require very different functions to the common platform. Moreover, in recent years, quite successful business models relying on three-sided platform-mediated networks are dominating the internet arena. This is the case of Facebook which links three set of network parties: regular users, application providers and advertisers. This paper considers platform-mediated networks (PMN's) as uniquely characterized by having evident network effects. In this sense traditional supply networks found in manufacturing, i.e. the supply chain developed by Apple to source products from China, would not be considered as PMN's as no cross-side network effects arise between final users of Apple's products and Apple's suppliers. Similarly, traditional business models of retailing should not be considered platform-mediated networks as they effectively act as principals in the transaction rather than as mere intermediaries. Once the intermediary becomes the owner of the good cross-side network effects cease to exist.
Network effects are paramount in platform-mediated networks as they determine the propensity of users to participate in the platform and as result promoting platform adoption. Network effects also influence the maximum amount that an individual participant is willing to pay for a product or service provided in the platform. However, it is important to note that a higher willingness to pay does not necessarily translate into higher profits for platform providers. The ability to extract economic value depends on the competitive dynamics in the platform-mediated network. [23] .
Due to network effects and other economies of scale, it might be the case that a single platform prevails over competing alternatives. This is the case of Microsoft in personal computing or Google in Internet search services. Determining when a networked market is likely to be served by a single platform is paramount to identify an optimum strategy to compete as it is usually the case that whenever a single platform dominates there are only a few players, and oftentimes a single one, remaining. According to [24] and [25] , two-sided markets are prone to be served by single platforms, termed as a winner-takes-all regime, under the following conditions:
(1) cross-side network effects are positive and strong, (2) multi-homing costs are high and (3) limited user´s preference for differentiated functionality.
Arguably firms participating in platform-mediated networks subject to winner-takes-all regimes must tread carefully on finding optimal business models. They should take into account each stakeholder's interest to balance platform adoption with economic returns and adequate governance models in order to ensure platform stability [21] .
In this context, mobile telecommunications provide a relevant example of a large technical system [20] involving complex technologies in transmission and signal processing. Arguably mobile services exhibit strong network effects, i.e users value the ability to reach others, as well as require high levels of coordination among service providers to offer worldwide coverage and service reliability.
Mobile networks as initially planned in the past decade resembled its landline counterpart in the sense of providing basic voice communication services to its subscribers. In this sense former mobile services could be conceptualized as a single-sided platform-mediated network (see Figure 1 ). Firms participating in early stages of mobile network development had to compete in a winner-takes-all regime. This is the case as there were strong positive network effects, expensive multi-homing costs and limited expectations for differentiated functionality (for example, users expected regular voice services).
As predicted by the theory, competing firms opted for a shared platform to ensure that gains from cooperation offset the costs of competition and inherent risk associated with a winner-takes-all regime [24] . The Global System for Mobile Communications initiative (GSM), constituted in 1982, was therefore a model of governance whereby competing firms such as Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens and Alcatel agreed on a set of common standards to: (1) reduce rivalry by restricting membership, (2) defined a revenue mechanism to profit from previous investments in intellectual property and (3) ensure technical interoperability in order to enact economies of scale in hardware manufacturing (i.e. network equipment and handsets -3GPP 2012, GSM 1982-). This shared platform scheme, in which firms collaborates in developing the platform's technology and then compete with each rival in providing differentiated but compatible versions of the platform, has been the preferred choice to develop subsequent mobile standards such as 3GPP UMTS or GPP LTE.
However, modern mobile ecosystems have evolved into two diverging platform-mediated networks. The first is following the traditional shared-model of standards and technology development while the second is rapidly emerging as a result of the digital convergence (see figure 2) . Being both platforms subject to strong same-side effects, the emerging one is of two-sided nature as a new group of users come into play: software application developers. Moreover, strong cross-side network effects are established between both groups as mobile subscribers exhibit a strong preference for mobile platforms that are rich in software applications and components, informally termed as "apps". Contrary to what would be expected, according to existing theory, firms competing in this two-sided platform mediated networks have not opted for shared models of governance in spite of facing winner-takesall regimes. Moreover firms such as Google and Apple with no previous experience or market share in the mobile business have established successful platforms, Android and iPhone respectively, based on proprietary governance models. The following subsection will provide insights on this paradox.
Models of governance and modularity in platform-mediated networks and
There exist two different models for organizing platform-mediated networks i. Proprietary platforms in which a single provider controls its technology. This is the case of Apple's Macintosh platform.
ii. Shared platforms with multiple firms collaborating in developing the platform's technology and then competing with each other offering different but compatible versions of the platforms. This would be the case with the traditional mobile standards sponsored by the 3GPP consortium, Visa or the DVD standards.
Some platforms exist however as combinations of the before mentioned models. On the one hand, jointventure platforms, in which several firms cooperate in developing the platform but a single entity serves as its sole provider. This is the case of Nokia collaborating with Intel to develop Meego as a new platform in the mobile business. On the other hand, licensing models with a single company developing a platform's technology and licensing it to other firms as providers, (refer to Figure 3) . Theory in strategic management predicts proprietary as the dominating model when the firm posses any advantage over its rivals, either via patents or technology and big investments are required upfront. Shared platforms would be the preferred choice in markets subject to winner-takes-all dynamics and lack of sustainable competitive advantages. An important characteristic of shared-platforms is that it offers protection against hold-up by a proprietary platform monopoly.
Established theory fails, however, to explain recent failures of industrial initiatives to sponsor shared platforms for the provision of advanced mobile services when confronted with proprietary platforms sponsored by firms with any relevant competitive advantage in this sector. This is the case of the Nokia-Intel consortium failing to cope with newcomers such as Google or Apple.
The present paper contends that extant theory on platform-mediated networks requires that additional factors need to be taken into account to establish stronger causal relationships. More precisely we think that the internal structure of the platform, in itself a technological system, strongly influences the adopted model of governance by firms. In this sense, modularity must be considered as an important attribute in technical systems, which decisively influences the strategy of firms participating in platform-mediated networks. Due to restrictions imposed by modularity, firms must broaden their scope of collaboration with third parties and as a result new organizational forms emerge.
Several authors have documented that in markets with high rates of competition and technological change firms often strive for flexibility as a core competency to better adapt to user needs and dynamic environments [26] , [27] . Modularity, as the ability of a complex system to be separated into loosely coupled components, has been documented in the research literature as a powerful alternative to provide flexibility in product design, product manufacturing and product use [28] , [29] . Moreover there exist an established relationship among modularity as an organizational form and heterogeneity of users demands [30] . Arguably in a context in which demand is non homogeneous economies of scale do not exist, or at least are difficult to achieve, and the ability to provide customized products or services becomes a core competency.
Modularity, arguably a desirable property in systemic neo-schumpeterian technological systems, is also paramount in achieving economies of substitution arising when the cost of designing an improved system through existing components is lower than the cost of a new system developed from scratch [31] .
To reveal the impact of modularity in platform-mediated networks, [28] considers technological innovation and development as a search process in a given multidimensional design space. Under this perspective a platform exhibiting modularity creates a large variety of alternatives, or innovation trajectories, for the firm to choose from. However modularity comes at a cost as it opens new avenues, not necessarily beneficial for the firm sponsoring the platform, to conduct innovation and development. It can be shown that modular platforms involve several costs including: those associated with the design of a modular architecture (Cdesign), (2) those related to testing new modules (Ctest) and (3) costs of overall experimentation (Cexp). Mathematically speaking:
where j corresponds to the number of modules and k the number of experiments performed. As a result firms must then carefully balance the cost of designing a modular technological system, the costs of performing independent experiments to explore the design space and the costs arising because of module-level tests to identify best candidates. Given that design costs are fixed, however expensive they may be, the majority of costs are due to experimentation and testing. Furthermore, it can be proved that to avoid inferior designs and achieve sufficient rates of innovation modular systems, minimum levels of testing, usually very high, are required. In order to test the influence of modularity on governance models adopted by firms in their platform-mediated networks we suggest the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: In presence of modular architectures, proprietary models of governance dominate even in markets subject to winner-takes-all dynamics and lack of sustainable competitive advantages.
Modular architectures affect costs by introducing a new term associated with module testing. Moreover as shown in equation (1) this cost might become very large even for a small number of experiments and modules involved. As a result, firms must either face the total cost with internal resources, for example engineers, or opting for sharing the cost with, a large set of, external parties.
Cost sharing has been successfully practiced in a myriad of contexts from software development [12] to product innovation [3] . Moreover opening the platform to external parties has been shown to posit several advantages in terms of market acceptance of accelerated rates of innovation [2] , [7] , [32] . However, open modes of innovation and development [33] present some managerial challenges for sponsoring firms which must soften their intellectual property policy in order to accommodate external parties with different business objectives and incentives.
In order to test the impact of resorting to external parties as far as models of governance are concerned, we suggest the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: In presence of modular architectures, proprietary models of governance must incorporate a large set of external parties.
Proprietary platforms in winner-takes-all regimes: the case of Ericsson
In order to test the hypotheses proposed, we explore a relevant example of a proprietary model of governance implemented by Ericsson, arguably a relevant stakeholder in the mobile sector. Taking into account the objective of this paper, the case of Ericsson is interesting as this firm has played an important role along the evolution of mobile platforms. Moreover, this case is relevant as Ericsson has practiced different strategies always evolving according to its commercial interests in the telecommunication industry.
Ericsson, a Swedish multinational founded in 1876, is arguably a major stakeholder in the telecommunications market. According to its figures, more than 40% of the world's mobile traffic traverses its networks. Moreover, four of the top-five mobile handset manufacturers, including Nokia, use Ericsson's technology to implement their products. Ericsson is also a key player in mobile-related technologies such as Wireless Networks (WiFi) as a consequence of the technical capabilities it posses in this domain, according to Manuel Lorenzo (Director of Technology and Innovation business unit at Ericsson): "most WiFi chipsets in the world are or will be using a patent owned by Ericsson". It has also been a key stakeholder is the majority of standardization committees related to telecommunication for the past two decades, with large research productivity as measures by its large patent portfolio (25000 patents and adding to its stock 500 new ones each year). It has also implemented technological platforms with other players such as Nokia, Alcatel, Cisco, Siemens and others, and has developed its own proprietary platforms and technologies. Therefore, this company has experience in both models of governance. However, while Ericsson is still a firm believer of shared models of governance in platform-mediated networks, it is also an active contributor in the development of new standards, technologies and delivery services of new mobile architectures, namely long term evolution (LTE).
Nevertheless, the firm has started experimenting with novel approaches to compete in the mobile telecommunication industry in recent years. Unlike other firms in the mobile business, Ericsson has established partnership agreements with universities and developers, acquired and divested internal units and acquired new technologies [34] .
According to experts interviewed, this firm engaged systematically in open collaboration with external users in 2007, initially as a test at the Beijing University of Post and Telecommunications. Over 700 students signed up for a novel service combining mobile communications, social networks and user-generated context. According to the managers in charge of this initiative, the purpose of the test was to engage external, technically savvy, users into the early development stages in order to receive feedback regarding functionality and usability, which in the end could help Ericsson to provide attractive and well-functioning services to users. Given the early success of this preliminary initiative, it has been further scaled up at a corporate level worldwide.
The flagship project representing this emerging mode of competing in platform-mediated networks is an experimental online toolkit which allows external developers to build new mobile applications leveraging Ericsson's technical infrastructure and knowledge [35] . This toolkit provides developers with customary elements in software development: programming interfaces, debug and testing services and technical documentation at no cost for external parties and no previous formal agreement. External users interested in collaborating have access to a myriad of components to develop applications in domains such as social, geolocation, media streaming, communication, sensor and security.
Recently, an international development contest has been organized by Ericsson with up to forty five thousand Euros in prizes. In total, 123 international teams joined initially: 62 from Europe, 8 from Brazil, 4 from the USA and 27 from China (among many others from countries such as India or Pakistan). In the end, 43 effective submissions were in place by deadline [36] . In spite of being oriented towards technically savvy students, the contest did specifically put an emphasis not on technology per se but rather on new ideas related to everyday use such as sustainability, social or fun. According to managers interviewed, Ericsson intended to explore, with the help of the students entering the contest, new ideas and concepts which might develop into new markets or solutions involving mobile networks and services.
Thus Ericsson benefits from external contributions by further developing potential applications into commercial releases suitable for production environments. Doing so, the firm ensures that the technologies developed in its innovation platform are fully compatible with its commercial hardware thereby reducing the efforts to incorporate external developments into its own internal development cycles. As a matter of fact, the innovation platform provides testing services in facilities that mimic real production environments. So, apart from scalabilty, security and charging applications developed externally are fully compatible with production environments.
An important factor determining the success of any platform is the existence of a minimum base of users willing to participate. In this case, and having decided to opt for a proprietary platform, the firm needs to ensure a minimum set of users. Ericsson`s approach to provide incentives for external users relies on: (1) the establishment of agreements with leading universities worldwide to conduct research and development, (2) appoint new positions, named technical evangelists, responsible for developing communities in important markets (such as China or Latin America) and (3) organize public contests in which economic prizes are offered to the best submitted applications.
Technical experts interviewed emphasize the challenge of providing toolkits which offer enough flexibility to be capable of integrating different solution domains (geomapping, gaming, media streaming) into a single, coherent framework. Toolkits for developing platform components must not also offer flexibility but at the same time they must ensure interoperability with the inner core of the mobile architecture. This is that an application developed by an external user must be compatible with telecommunication networks and smartphones.
Ericsson overcomes this by defining the so-called service enablers, standardized components providing an interface with inner functionalities in the mobile network. Hence, developers relying upon existing enablers are able to combine services into novel mobile applications. As an illustrating example, a certain developer combines geo-location, as provided by the mobile infrastructure with a social service provided by the Internet to come up with a new application to find people in the nearby sharing similar interests.
Therefore, the concept of service enabler is important in two aspects. First, it hides inherent complexity in mobile services. Second, it fosters interoperability among technological systems such as mobile networks and the Internet (see Figure 4) . Thanks to these service enablers, a modular platform is presented to external parties interested in developing components for Ericsson. The technical structure of Ericsson's proprietary platform is quite similar to others sponsored by firms such as Google, Nokia or Apple in the sense of being an aggregation of modules admitting composition and substitution whose integration is controlled by a single entity. These phenomena observed in the most relevant firms participating in the mobile communication market, reinforces the first hypothesis suggested in this paper, which proposed that in presence of modular architectures, proprietary models of governance dominate even in markets subject to winner-takes-all dynamics and lack of sustainable competitive advantages. Table 1 provides data concerning contributions from external parties to Apple and Google proprietary platforms, AppStore and Android respectively, during one observed month [37] . According to the data, thousands of new applications have been developed for both platforms in a single month spanning from games, office productivity or social media. Arguably it will be difficult for any company to sustain such a large level of innovation with its own internal resources. This sustains our second hypothesis because of in presence of modular architectures, proprietary models of governance benefit from a large set of external parties contributing with new ideas and components. 
Conclusions and future research areas
In this paper we present the case of Ericsson in order to provide interesting insights on how firms competing in the mobile business are adapting their strategies with the aim of incorporating external resources into their platforms. On the one hand, Ericsson behaves as predicted by theory on platform-mediated networks because it cooperates with other firms following a shared model approach to develop mobile platforms. This is the case, for instance, with recent developments of the 4G mobile standards. On the other hand, this firm departs from shared models when competing in two-sided networks in which application providers have strong network effects with final users. In this case, Ericsson opts for a proprietary model to develop its own platform.
Our study suggests that, in order to better characterize competitive dynamics in platform-mediated networks, internal aspects of the platform must be considered. In this sense, modularity, a property oftentimes present in large technical systems, determines the strategic approach followed by firms.
Our results are based on a detailed analysis of a relevant player in the mobile industry contrasted with personal interviews with experts and managers of the firm. The insights provided by this research broadens the extant theory on strategic management in the context of two-sided networks by suggesting that in proprietary platforms, as well as in shared ones, it is important to develop governance models that fosters the participation of external agents ranging from individual contributors, universities to for-profit firms. Our results have important implications for managers in charge of developing business models in firms exposed to winnertakes-all regimes and with no apparent competitive advantage. We recommend them to take into account the important role played by external contributors for maintaining innovation rates in contexts of complex and modular platforms.
We must acknowledge some limitations of this study which could lead us to future research. We have carried out a qualitative study that can be improved by considering other platforms in order to reaffirm the validity of the hypothesis. By adding new platforms, it could be possible to extend our results to other sectors, not necessarily IT intensive industries, or to provide further insights on the causal effects between internal platform structures and optimal models of governance in platform-mediated networks. Additionally, further quantitative research, using available data concerning mobile ecosystems and business models, could be advisable.
